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This pamphlet contains the report by Mao Tse-tung on
the "Present Situation and Our Tasks" to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, December
25, 1947. It is the fifth important document by Mao Tsetung since 1937. The first was On Protracted War (19881,
an analysis of the nature of China's war against Japan. The
second, On a New Stage (19381, discussed the stalemate
in the war against Japan. The third, China's New Democracy (19391, @ves the broad outline for the future develop
ment of China; and the fourth, The Fight for a New China
(19451, txpiains the: nature of China's prospective d m *
cratic coalition government.
The text of this pamphlet is from New China News
Agency, Hongkong. The captions are the publisher's.
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OM DEFENSIYIE TO

OFFENSIVE
The revolutionary war of the Chinese peopk has now
reached a turning point. The Chinese People's Liberation
Army has repeIled the attacks of several million reac-
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tionary troops of Chiang Kai-shek, running dog of Amerimn imperialism, and has itself gone over to the offensive.
Already during the first year of the war, from July, 1946,
to June,1947, the People's Liberation Army had repelled
Chiang Kai-shek's offensives an several battlefronts, forcing him over to the defensive. And since the first quarter
of the second year of war, between July and September,
1947, the People's Liberation Army has gone over to the
offensive on a nation-wide scale. It has smashed Chiang
Kai-shek's counterrevolutionary plan to direct the war
toward the l i b e r a d areas with the objective of destroying
them completely.
Already the war is no longer waged mainly in the fiberated areas, but in Kuomintang-controlled areas. The main
forces of the People's Liberation A m y have already fought
their way into Kuomintangcontrolled areas. The Chinese
People's Liberation Army in this land of China has reversed the counterrevolutionary wheels of American imperialism and of Chiang Kaishek's gang of brigands onto
the road to ruin. They have pushed forward their own
revolutionary wheels along the road to victory.
This is a turning point in history. It is the turning point
from growth to extermination in 20 years of the counterrevolutionary rule of Chiang Kakhek. It is the turning
point from growth to extermination in more than 100
years of the rule of imperialism in China.
This is a great event. This went is great because it oc3

curs in a country of 450 11lil1io11
people. Once it has take11
place, it will of necessity move toward nationwide victory.
This event, furthermore, is great because it occurs in the
eastem part of the world where there is a population
totalling more than one billion (half of mankind), sufEering from the oppression of imperialism.
The turn of the Chinese people's war of liberation from
the defensive to the offensive cannot but bring jubilation
and encouragement to these oppressed nations. At the
same time, it is also a form of aid to the oppressed peoples
now struggling in various countries of Europe and the
Americas.

2. CHUNG'S COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY WAR
From the very day on which Chiang Kai-shek launched
his counterrevolrltionary war, we said that we not only
Inust, but could, defeat Chiang Kai-shek. We must defeat
Chiang Kai-shek because the war launched by him i s a
counterrevolutionary war directed by American im perialism against the independence of the Chinese' nation
and the liberation of the Chinese people.
The tasks of the Chinese people after the condusion of
World War 11 and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism
were to effect new demwratic reforms politimlly, as well
as economically and culturally, to realize the unity and
independence of the nation, and to change from an agricultural into an industrial country. But precisely at this
time, after the victorious conclusion of World War 11,
American imperialism and its running dogs in various
countries replaced German and Japanese imperialism and
their running dogs, and organized a reactionary camp
against the Soviet Union and the new democratic countries .of Europe, against the working-class movement in
the capitalist countries, against the national movement in
the colonies and semi-ci)lonies. and against the liberation
of the Chinese people.
4
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In this situation the Chinese reactionay clique headed
by Chiang kai-shek bemme the running dog of American
imperialism just as Weng Ching-wei had previously become the running dog of Japanese imperialism. They sold
out China to America, unleashed war, oppmd the
Chinese people, and obstructed the advance of the cause
of the people's liberation. Had we at this time displayed
weakness and yielded, had we not dared resolutely to arise
to fight the counterrevolutionarg war with revolutionary
war, China would have become a world of darkness, and
the future of our nation would have been sacrificed. The
Chinese People's Liberation Army, led by the Chinese
Communist Party, resolutely engaged in a patriotic, just,
revolutionary war against the offensives of Chiang Kaishek. Rasing itself on the experience of Marxism-teninism,
the Chinese Communist Party clearIy estimated the international and domestic situation, and knew that all the
attacks of domestic and foreign reactionaries not only
must, but could, be defeated.
When the skies seemed dark we pointed out that this
was but temporary, that the tempest would soon be over,
and that the light of dawn was just ahtad. When Chiang
Kai-shek's gang of brigands launched a nation-wide countemevolutionarg war in July, 1946, they considered that
only three to six months were required to defeat the People's Liberation Army.
They counted on two million reguIar army trmps, more
than one rnilIion irregular troops and more than one million personnel and troops of rear-area military organizations-a total military strengtb of more than four nlillion
men. They had already gained time to complete prepamtions for the offensive. They again controlled the big cities;
they held a population of mare than 300 million; they
had taken over all equipment of the one million troops
of the Japanese Army invading Cbina; and they had
obtained huge military and financial aid horn the United
States Government.
5
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Furthermore, they thought the Chinese People's Libemtion Army had glready fought itself out in the course of
eight years of the anti-Japanege war, and was far behind
the Kuomintang army in numbers and equipment. The
Chinae liberated areas still had only a population of a
little over 100 million. The reactionary forces of feudalism
in most of these areas had not yet been cleaned out. The
land reform was still not universal and thorough, and the
rear ofthe People's Liberation Army not yet consolidated.
Based on all this, Chiang Kai-shek's gang of brigands,
heedIess of the Chinese people's yearning for peace, once
and for all tore up the truce signed by both-the Cornmunist and Kuomintang parties in January, 1946, and the
resolutions of the Politid Consultative Conference of
various parties and group, and hunched, an adventurous
war. At that time we said that our enemy's superiority
in military strength was only temporary, a factor playing
only a temporary role. The aid of American imperialism
was likewise a factor playing only a temporary role.
On the o w r hand, the anti-popular nature of Chiang
Kai-shek's war, and the s u p p or opposition of the people are factors playing a constant role, and in these the
superiority belongs ~o the People's Liberation Army. The
struggle of the People's Liberation Army is patriotic,
just apd revolutionary, which mmt of necessity gain the
support of the people throughout the country. This is the
political basis for conquering Chiang fi-shek. The experience of 18 months fully bears out our judgment.

Seventeen months of combat-July, 1946, to November,
1947, with December not yet included, datroyed a total of
1,690,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's regular and irregular
troop, of 'which 640,000 were killed or wounded and
1,050,000 were taken prisoner. Our troops were thus
enabled ta repel the offensive of Chiang KaMhek, pre6
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serve the hasic regions of the liberated areas, and go over
to the ofEensive. Militarily speaking, we were able to do
this because we carried out a correct strategic line. Our
military principles are:
1. First strike scattered and isolated groups of the
enemy, and later strike conceritrated, powerful group.
2. First take small and middle-sized towns and cities
and the broad countryside, and later take big cities.
3. The major objective is the annihilation of the enemy
fighting strength, and not the holding or taking of cities
and places. The holding or taking of cities and place is
the result of the annihilation of the enemy's fighting
strength, which often has to be repeated manyatimes before they mn be finally held or taken.
4. In every battie, concentrate absolutely superior
forcts+iouble, triple, quadruple, and sometimes wen five
or six times chose of the enemy-to encircle the enemy on
all sides, and strive for his annihilation, with none esmping
from the net. Under specific conditions, adopt the methcd
of dealing the enemy smashing blows, that is, the concentration of all £ o m to strike the enemy's center and one
or both of the enemy's flanks, aiming at the datruction of
a part of the enemy and the routing of another part so that
our troops m swiftly transfer forces to smash another
enemy p u p . Avoid battles of attrition in which gains
are not sufficient to make up for the losses, or in which the
gains mere1y balance the lasses. Thus we are inferior taken
as a whole--numerimlly speaking-but our absolute superiority in wery section and in wery specific campaign
guarantees the victory of each mmpaign. As time goes by,
we will become superior, taken as a whole, until the enemy
is totally destroyed.
5. Fight no unprepared engagements; fight no engagements in which there is no assurance of victory. Strive
for preparation and assurance of victory in wery engagement based on the relative conditions of out forces and
those of the enemy.
7

6. Promote and exemplify valor i n combat; fear no
sacrifice or fatigue nor continuous actions-that is, fighting
seqeral engagements in succession within a short period
without respite.
7. Strive to destroy the enerny while in movement. At
the same time, emphasize the tac tiai of attacking positions,
wresting strong points and bases honi the enemy.
8. With regard to assaults on cities, resoluteIy wrest
from the enemy all strong points and cities which are
weakly defended. At favorable opportunities, wrest all the
enemy's strong points and cities which are defended to a
medium deg.reeand where the circumstances permit. Wait
until conditions hature, and then wrest a11 enemy strong
points and cities which are powerfuIIy defended.
9. Replenish ourselves by the capture of all enemy arms
and most ofhis personnel. The source of men and materiel
Eor our army is mainly at the front,
10. SkillEully utilize the intervals between two campaigns for resting, regrouping and training troop. The
period of rest and regrouping should in genehl not be
too long. As Ear as possible do not let the enemy-have
breathing space.
All the above are the principal methods by which the
People's Liberation A m y defeats Chiang Kai-shek.
These methods were Eorged by the People's Liberation
Army in the course of proIonged warhre with domestic
and foreign enemies, and are entirely suitable to our p m ent wnditions. Chiang Kai+hek's gang of brigands and
the military personnel of American imperialism in China
are well aware oE our military methods. Chiang Kai-shek
has many tima mIled together his generals and field officers for training, issuing for study our military books and hume.nts obtained in battle, attempting to seek

.

counter-measures.
The Amerim military personnel suggest this and that
s.trategy and tactic to Chiang Kai4hek for destroying the
People's Liberation Army, directly train troop for
8

Chiang Kai-shek, a n d supply him with military equip
ment. But none of these efforts mn save Chiang Kai-shek's
gang of brigands from defeat. This is because our strategy
and tactia are founded on a peopla' war. No anti-popular
q y mn utilize our strategy and tactics. A vital factor
in conquering the enemy is the establishment of strong
and powerful revolutionary palitical work by the Peopk's
Libmation' Army based on a people's war and on the
solidarity of army and people, the solidarity of commanders and fighters, and the disintegration of thi enemy.
When we dodged the mortal blows of the superior
enemy, transferred our military forces to seek the destruction of the enemy in movement, and abandoned many
cities on our own initiative, our enemy was jubilant. They
considered that this was their victory and our defeat. T h e y
went dizzy over the so-called successes of a moment.
On the second day of Kalgan's occupation Chiang Kaishek ordered the convening of his reactionary National
Assembly, as if his reactionary rule would henceforth be
as secure as the Tai Mountain.* The Amerimn imperialists were-also cutting joyous capers, as if their wild
schemes of converting China into an American koiony
could henceforth be carried out without hindrance.
But as time went by, Cfiiang Kai-sh6k and his American
masters changed their tune. Now all domestic and foreign
enemies are dominated by pessimistic sentiments, They
heave great sighs, loudly proclaiming a crisis; and not even
a trace of joy is to be seen.
In the course of I8 months, most of Chiang Kai-shek's
high-ranking frontline commanders have been dismissed
or r4lam.d because of their military defeats. Among them
are Chengchow's Liu Chih, Hsuchow's Hsueh Y ueh, north
Kimgsu's Wu Chi-wei, south Shantung's Tang En-po,
north Honan's Wang Chung-Lien, Mukden's T u Yu-ming
and Hsiung Shih-hui, Peiping's Sun Lien-chung and
Tabhan is one of China's five famous rnountainr.

9

.

others. Chiang Kai-shek's Chief of the General St&, Chen
Cheng, empowered to direct over-all operations, was also
deprived of his command and demoted to commander of
a single battlefront, Manchuria.
But during the period in which Chiang Kai-shek himself replaed Chen Cheng as &era11 commander, there
developed the situation in which Chiangis armies passed
over from the offensive to the defensive and the People's
Liberation Army passed over from the defensive to the
offensive. Chiang Kai-sbek's reactionary clique and their
American masters should now be aware of their own
mistakes, A11 efforts of the Chinese Communist Party during a long period after the Japanese surrender to assure
peace and oppose civil war-efEorts that represented the
yearnings of the Chinese people-they regarded as expressions of cowardice and feebleness. They overestimated
their own strength, undera timated revolutionary strength,
and adventurously unleashed war, and thereby fell into
the trap they themselves had laid. The strategic calculations of the enemy have miscarried completely.

,

4, TI333 AGRARIAlYREFORM
At present, the rear areas of the People's Liberation
A m y are much more consolidated than 18 months ago.
This is because our Party resolutely sided with the peasants
in reforming the agrarian system. During the anti-Japanese
war, For the sake of establishing an anti-Japanese united
front with the Kuomintang and uniting all people who
a t the time were still capable of resisting Japan, our Party
on its own initiative changed from the policy before the
anti-Japanese war of confiscating landlords' lands and
distributing them to the peasants to that of reducing rents
and interest. This was entirely neFessary.
After the Japanese surrender, the peasants urgently demanded land and we, therefore, made a timely decision
to change the agrarian policy of reducing rents and in10

tereats to one of conhating the lands of the landlord class
and distributing them to the peasants. The directive issued
by our Party*s CentraI Committee on May 4, 1946, exp r e d this change. h September, 1947, our Party w n vened a National Agrarian Conference, worked out the
basic program on Chinese agrarian law, and immediately
carried it wt universally throughout the various areas.
This step not only affirmed the Ihe.of last year's May 4
directive, but aIso made dear-cut changes, such as not
permitting to the landlord more land and properties than
the peasants, and no longer leaving the land and properties
of rich peasants untouched in principle. The basic program
on Chinese agrarian law stipuIates that under the principle
of eliminating the agrarian system of feudal and semifeudal exploitation and establishing the agrarian system
of land to the tillers, the land shall be equally distributed
accmding to population. This is the most thorough
method of eliminating the feudal system and entirely conforms with the demands of broad masses of the peasants.
In order resofutefy and thoroughly to carry out the
agrarian reform, not only peasant unions of the broadat
character, and their elected committees, comprising the
great masses of fann laborers, poor peasants and middle
peasants must be organized in the villages; but also, and
first of all, poor peasants' leagues, and their elected committees, wmprhieg the m e s of poor peasants and farm
laborers, must be organized in the villa*.
These will be the legaI organs for carrying out the
agrarian reform, and the poor peasants' organization
should become the backbone of the struggles of all rural
areas. Our policy is to rely on the poor peasints, to unite
solidly with the middle peasants to destroy the feudal and
semi-feudal exploitation system of the landlord class and
old-type rich peasants.
The land and properties distributed to the landlords
and rich peasants shall not exceed thclse distributed to the
peasant masses, But neither should the erroneous ultra-
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left policy carried out between I931 and 1934, the so-called
"distribute no land to the landlords, and poor land to the
rich peasants" policy, be repeated.
The proportion of landlords and rich peasanu ib the
village ppulation m a y be greater or smaller in various
places, but generalIy speaking they make up only approximately 8 per cent, reckoned in families. However, the Iand
they hold as a rule makes up 70 to 80 per cent of all land.
'Thel-efure,our agrarian reform is opposed to a very small
rlumbw of people, while the number of people (families)
in the villages who can and should partidpate in the
agrarian-refom united front make up over 90 per cent.
T w o basic principles must be noted here: First, it is
necessary to satisfy the demands of the poor peasants and
farm laborers-this is the most basic task of the agrarian
reform. Second, it is necessary to unite resolutely the
middle peasants and not injure their interests. We need
only grasp these two basic principles, and the tasks of our
agrarian reform will surely triumph completely.
In accordance with the principle of equal distribution,
the surplus land and a portion of the propertier of oldtype rich peasants should be distributed because China's
rich peasants in general have a heavy feudal and semifeudal exploiting nature. Most rich peasants collect land
rents and engage in usury, and the conditions of their
hired labor are semi-feudal.
Also because the land they hold is very .great in quantity
and very good in quality, the demands of the poor peasants
and farm Iaborers cannot be satisfied if equal distribution
is not carried.out. But, in accordance with the stipulatioa~
of the basic program on Chinese agrarian law, in general
there should be differentiation between the treatment of
rich peasants and landlords.
In the course of agrarian reform, the middle peasants
express approval of equal land distribution be-use it
does not harm the middle peasants. In equal distribution,
the land of a portion of d ~ emiddle peasants remains un12

r.hanged: the land of another portion increases, Only a
portion of well-to-domiddle peasants have a small quantity
of surplus land, and they are willing to hand it over for
equal distribution, because thereby their land tax burden,
is lighter. Nevertheless, in mrrying out equal distribution
in the various areas, it is still necessary to heed the
opinions of the middle peasants; if they do not agree, concessions should be made to them.
In the c o n k t i o n and distribution of the land and
properties of the feudal classes, attention should be paid
to the needs of certain middle peasants. !
n the demarcation of rural class composition, a r e must be taken not to
assign those who are really middle peasants erroneudy
to the rich peasant mtegory. Active elements among the
middle peasants mwt be absorbed into Peasant Union
Committees and the government and their work. With regard to the burdens of land taxation and support of the
war, just and equitable principles shouId
adopted. All
these are the concrete policies that must be adopted by
our Party in carrying out the strategic task of solidly uniting the middle peasants.
The entire Party must understand that the thorough
reform of the agrarian system is the basic task of the
present stage of the Chinese revotution. If we can universally and thoroughly solve the agrarian question, we
will have obtained the most basic condition required for
conquering all enemies.

+

5. REORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY
T o carry out resolutely and thoroughly the agrarian
reform and consolidate the rear amas of the People's
Liberation Army, it is necessary to reorganize and survey
the ranks of the Party. The movement for the rebmation
of ideology and of style of work within our-Party during
the period of the anti-Japanese war in general attained
gucceq, This success lay, in the main. in that our leading
13
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organs and many cadres were able to advance a step further
in their grasp of such a basic orientation as the integration
of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. In this respect,
our Party has taken a great stride forward in comparison
with the several historical periods prior to the antiJapanese war.
.
However, the question of the impure composition and
the working style of the Party's 1-1
organizations, and
mpeciaUy of the Party's primary rulfal organizations, was
not solved During t&e 11 years Erom 1937 to 1947, our
Party organization developed from sevetal tens of thousands of Party members to 2,700,000. This is a huge leap
fomrd. It has made our Party an unprecedentedly strong
Party. It provided us with the possibiIities of defeating
Japanese imperialism and repelling the offensive of
Chimg Kai-shek, and leading the liberated areas of more
than 100 million population and a People's Liberation
Army two million strong.
. But along with this also came defects. Many landlords,
rich peasants and scoundrctls took this oiportunity to slip
into our Party. They dominate many Party, pvehment
and mass organizations in the rural areas; lord it over,
bully and oppress the people; and distort the Party's
policies, causing these organizations to become alienated
horn the masses of the people and preventing the agrarian
reform from being carried through. Such serious mnditions place before us the task of reorganizing and puriEjing the ranks of the Party. If this task is not solved we
cannot make progress in the rural areas.
The Party's National Agrarian Conference thoroughly
discussed this question, and stipulated appropriate steps
and methods. .These steps and methods are now being
resoIuteIy carried out in the various areas in connection
with the equal distribution of land.
Among them, the first in importance is the unfolding
of criticism and self-criticism within the Party, thoroughly
14
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to expose erroneous thinking and serious deviations from
the Party's line in the o m i z a t i o n s of various areas. All
Party comradeg must realize that the solution of this question, reorganizing and purifying the ranks of the Party,
enabling the Party to travel in the same direction with the
broadat laboring masses and lead them forward, is a
decisive link in solving the agrarian question and supporting the prolonged warfare.

6. ECQNOMIC STRUCTURE OF NEW €ElNA
Confismte the land of the feudal dassa and p u ~ i under
t
the ownership of the peasants; confiscate the monopoly
capital headed by Chiang Kaikhek, T. V. Soong, H. H.
Kung, and Chen Id-fu and put it under the ownership of
the new democratic state; protect national industry and
commerce--these are the three great economic planks of
the new democratic revolution.
The four families--Chiang, Soong, Kung and Chenduring their twenty pars in power, have amassed
enonn0.w capital worth 10 to 20 billion American dollars,
and monopolized the economic pulse of the entire country.
This monopoly capital, merged with state power, bzwmes state-monopoly capital. This monopoly capitalism.
intimately merged with foreign imperialism and the
dommtic landlord class' and pld-style rich peasants, becomes compradore-feudal,state-monopoly capitalism. This
is the economic foundation of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary regime. This state-monopoly capitalism not only
oppresses workers and peasants, but also oppresses the petty
bourgeoisie and injures the middle bourgeoisie. This
state-monopoly capitalism reached its highest peak during
the anti-Japanese war and after the Japanese surrender.
It prepared the full material conditions for the new democratic revolution.
This capital is popularly called bureaucratic capital in
15
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China. This bourgeoisie is called the bureaucratic bourgeoisie; it is China's big bourgeoisie.
Apart from doing away with the special privileges of
imperialism in China, the object of the new democratic
revolution within the country is to eliminate exploitation
and oppression by the landlord class and the bureaucratic
bourgeoisie (the big bourgeoisie), transform compradorefeudal relations of production, and liberate all the imprisoned productive forces. The petty bourgeoisie and middle
bourgeoisie, oppressed and injured by these classes and
their state power, although they too are bourgeois, may
however .participate in the new democratic revolution or
maintain neutrality.
They have no or compa>atively few connections wit11
imperialism; they are the real national bourgeoisie. Wherever the state power of new democracy extends, these
classes must be firmly and unhesitatingly protected. Among
the upper petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie in the
areas ruled by Chiang Kai-shek, there is a portion, small
in number, with reactionary political tendencies, the rightist elements of these classes. They disseminate i!lasions
about American imperialism and C h h g Kai-shek'a reactionary bloc and oppose the people"^ democratic revolution.
As long as their reactionary tendencies can still influence the masses, we should carry on work of exposure
among the masses under tpeir influence-strike at their
political influence in order to liberate the masses from it.
But political blows are one thing, and economic extermination is another. If we confuse these two things, we will
commit mistakes.
The new democratic revolution is to eliminate only
feudalism and monopoly capitalism, only h e landIord
class and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (big bourgeoisie)not capitaIism in general and not the petty and the middle
bourgeoisie. Owing to the backwardnas of China's economy it will still be necessary to permit the existence, for
a long period, of the capitalist economy represented by the
16

broad petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie even
after the nation-wide victory of the revolution.
Furthermore, in accordance with the division of labor
in the national economy, the development of all sections
-among them beneficial to the national economy will still
be n e c e s q ; they will still be an indispensable part of the
entire national economy.
The petty bourgeoisie includes small-scale industrial
and commercial capitalists who hire workers and employees. But besides these, there are the broad, independent, small industrial and commercial businessmen who do
not hire workers or employees.With regard to these small
industrial and commercial businessmen, it goes without
saying that they should be firmly protected. After the
nation-wide victory of the revolution, the new democratic
state will have in its hands enprmous state capital which
controls the economic p u k of the entire country, taken
over from the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. It will also have
'the agriculturd emnomy emancipated from the feudal
system. Although for quite a long time the agricultural
economy will still be basically smttered and individual, it
can be guided step by step in the direction of mperatives
in the future. Under these conditions the existence and
development of small and middle capitalist elements are
not at all dangerous.
The same applies to the new rich peasant economy
which will necessarily come into being in the rt~raLareas
after the agrarian revolution.
Adopting ultra-Left, erroneous policies toward the petty
bourgeois and middle bourgeois economic elements as our
Party did in the period from 1931 to 1984 must absolutely
not be permitted to recur. Such policies were: excessively
high working conditions, excessively high income tax rates;
inhinging on industrial and commercial elements in the
agrarian reform; not taking as our objectives the development of production and a flourishing economy; not taking
'into account both public and private interests and benefits
17

to both tabor and capital, but taking as our objectives
shortLsighted, unilateral, so-called "welfare of the toilers"
policy. If thiar kind of mistake is repeated, it will nwegsarily
injure the interests of the laboring masses and of the new
democratic state.
There is a provision in the basic program on Chinese
agrarian law: "The property and le@ operation of industrial and commercial small business shall be protected
Erom infringement." T h e industrial and +commercialbusinessmen mentioned here include all independent, small
i~ldustrialand commercial businessmen, and a l small and
middle capitalist elements.
T o sum up, the economic structure of new China is:
1. State economy-this is the leading element;
2. An agricultural economy developing step by step
from individual toward collective fanning;
3. The economy of independent, small industrial and
commercial businessmen and the economy of small and
middle private capital.
These are the entire national economy oE the new
democracy.

The guiding principle of the national economy of the
the general objective
of developing production and a flourishing econofiy,
taking into account both public and private intmts and
benefits to both labor and capital. All pfhbples, policies
and "methods which deviate from this general objective
are eerroneous.

new democracy must closely pursue

7. NATIONAL UNITED FRONT
The People's Liberation Army issued a maaifesto in
October, 1947, in which it was stated: "Unite the workers,
peasants, soldiers, students, and commercial elements, a1l
opprased classes, a 1 people's organizations, all &-tic
parties and groups, all national minorities, overseas Chinese everywhere and other patriotic elements-unite t~
organize a national united front to strike down the dicta18
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torial government of Chiang Kai-shek and establish a
democratic coalition government."
This is the most basic political platform of the People's
Gberation Army as well as of the Chinese Communist
Party. Regarded superiicially, our revolutionary national
united front in the present period appears to have shrunk
as compared with the period of the anti-Japanese wart But
in reality it is only in the present period, it b only after
Chiang Kai-shek sold out the national interests to Arneria n imperialism and launched an anti-popular nation-wide
internal war, and it is only after the crimes of American
imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary ruling blot:
had been completely exposed before the Chinese people
chat our nationaI united front really broadened.
During the anti-Japanese war, Chiang Kai-shek and the
Kuomintang had noPcompleteIy lost prestige among the
Chinese people, they still had many daxptive functions.
It is different now: all their deceptions have been laid bare
by their own deeds. They have no masses whatsoever, and
they are already compIetely isolated. As opposed to the
Kuomintang, the Chinese Communist Party has not only
obtained the confidence of the broadest masses of the
people in the liberated areas, but has also obtained the
support of the broad masses of the people in the Kuomintangcontrolled areas and big cities. If in 1946 there was
still a section of people among the intelligentsia of the
upper petty and middIe bo~rgeoisieunder Chiang Kaishek's rule who still cherished the idea of a so-called "third
road," tbese ideas have now become bankrupt.
Owing to our Party's adoption of a thorough agrarian
policy, it is able to obtain the loyal support of the masses
of peasants much broader than during the anti-Japanese
war. Owing to the aggression of American imperialism, the
oppression of Chiang gai-shek, and our Party's correct
line of resolutely protecting the interests of the masses,
our Party has obtained the sympathy of the broad masges
of the working class, peasant classes, petty bourgeoisie and
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middle bourgeoisie in the areas under Chiang Kai-sl~ek's
rule. These masses unceasingly raise high the struggle
against American imperialism and Chiang Kaiahek's reactionary government bemuse they suffer from hunger,
because they are politicaily oppressed, and because Cl~iang
Kaiahek's anti-popular civil war has snatched away all of
the tjeople's means of life.
Their basic slogans are against hunger, against oppression, against civil war, and against American intervention
in China's dommtic affairs. Before and during the antiJapanese war and for a period after the Japanese surrender,
opposition to such an extent was never reached. Therefore,
we say that our new democratic revolutionary united front
is now broader and also more consolidated than at any.
p e r i d in the past.
This arises not only from our a&rian and urban policim, but is moreover closely connected with the general
political situation arising horn the victories of the People's
Liberation Army, Chiang Kai-shek's ping over Erom the
offensive to the defensive, the People's Liberation Army's
going over from the defensive to the offensive, and the
entering of the Chinese revoIution into a new period of
upsurge. The peopIe have now seen that the extinction of
Chiang Kai-shek's rule is already inevitable, and they therefore place their hopes on the Chinese Communist Party
and the People's Liberation Army. This is only natural.
Without the broadest united front comprising the overwhelming majority of the entire national population, the
victory of the Chinese New Democratic Revolution is
impossible. But this is not all, this united front must also
be under the firm leadorship of the Chinese Communist
Party. Without the firm leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, no revolutionary united front can be victorious.
In 1927, when the war of the Northern Expedition
reached its hei ht, the capitulators in our Party's leading
organs volunta ly abandoned leadelship of the masses of
peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and,middle bourgeoisie, and
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cspxiall y abandoned leadership over the armed forces,
musing the revolution of that time to meet with defeat.
During the anti-Japanese war, our Party o p p e d a
way of-thinking that approached capitulation, that is,
yielding to the Kuomintang's and-popular policies, trusting the Kuomintang niore than the masses, not daring to
give free rein to the mass struggle, not daring to enlarge
the liberated areas and the people's armies in the Japaneseoccupied areas, and presenting the leademhip of the antiJapanese war to the Kuomintang. Our Party carried on
a resolute struggle against this kind of feeble, incompetent
and decadent thinking which violated the principla of
Marxism-leainism. Our Party resolutely carried out the
pol it iml line of "developing progressive forces, winning
over middle-of-the-road forces, and isolating die-hard
forces," and resolutely enlarged the liberated areas and
the People's Liberation Army.
This policy not only guaranteed that our Party could
conquer Japanese imperialism during the period of Japanese imperialist aggression, but it also guaranteed that o t ~ r
Party without losses could shift smoothly to the pat11 OF
opposing Chmng hi-shek's countemevolutionary war wi ttl
a people's revolutionary war when Chiang Kai-shek waged
r:ounterrevolutionary war after the Japanese surrender.
And within a short period we had great victories. All Party
comrades must bear that historic lesson well in mind.

8. TRE LIGHT OF DAWN
In 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary blur
launched its nation-wide, anti-popular, internal war. it
dared to be adventurous not only because it relied on its
own superior military strength, but pricinpally because i t
relied on American imperialism, which it believed to be
extraordinarily powerhl and matcliiess throughout the
world, holding the atomic bomb in its hands. On the one
h,~nd. they believed chat American imperialism could
s ~ ~ , +them
~ * o iwith a steady scream of military and financial
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aid, and on the other hand, they wildly imagined the-somlled "necessity of war between the United States and the
Soviet Union" and the so-called "necessity of the outbreak
of a third wwld war."
Such reliance on American imperialism is a common
characteristic of the reactionary £0- in the various countries throughout the world after World War 11. This fact
reflects the seriousness of the blow dealt to world capitalism by Wqrld War 11, the feebleness of the reactionary
forces in the various countries and their psychologial
panic and loss of confidence. It reflects the powerful might
of the revolutionary forces of the whole world which causes
the reactionaries of various countries to feel them is no
way out except to rely on the aid of U.S. imperialism.
But, in real'ity, is American imperialism after World
W a r 11 as powerful as Chiang Kai-shek and the reactionaries of the various countries imagine? Can it really pour
a steady stream from America to succor Chiang Kai-shek
and the reactionaries of the various countries? Not in the
least. The economic strength of Americaa imperialism,
which grew during World War 11, is confronted with an
unstable and a steadily shrinking domestic and international market. Further shrinking of this market will
lead to the outbreak of an economic crisis.
Amerian war prosperity is merely a momentary phenomenon. Its strength is only superficial and ternpomry.
A crisis, like a voImno, is daily menacing American i m p
realism; it is sitting right on this volcano.
This situation forced American imperialist elements to
establish a p h for enslaving the world, to plunge like
a wild beast into Europe, Asia, and other places, muster
the reactionary forces of various countries--&= dregs
spat out by the people-to organize the imperialist antidemocratic front against all democratic forces headed by
the Soviet Union, prepare war, scheming at some m o t e
day in the future to unleash World War I11 and defeat
the democratic h
.
1
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This is a wild p h . The democratic forces of the whole
world must, and an, completely defeat this plan. The
strength of the world anti-imperiaiisist o m p exceeds that
d the imperiallt amp. The superiority is with us, not
with the enemy, The anti-imperialist camp headed by the
Soviet Union has Jready been formed.
With no crises, steadily growing, and cherished by the
broad masses of the people of the whole world, the strength
of the S&list Soviet Union now already exceeds that of
imperialist M e r i c a , which is seriously menaced by crisis,
which is declining, and is opposed by the broad masses
of the people of the whole world.
The various new democratic countries of Europe are
consolidating themselves internally and uniting with one
another. The anti-imperialist Eorces of the people of various European mpitalist countries, especially in France and
Italy, are growing. Within the United States the people's
democratic forces are daily growing stronger.
The peoples of L a t m Amerim are not at all slaves subservient to America. A mighty national liberation movement has arisen throughout all Asia. All forces of the antiimperialist camp are uniting and developing.
The Communist parties of nine European countries
have organized an information bureau and published a
summons to battle, alling on the people of the whole
world to arise in opposition to the imperialist plans of
enslavement.
This summons to battle has inspired the oppressed peoples of the whole world, pointed out to them the direction
of struggle, and consolidated their coddence in victory.
Confronted with this summons to battle, the reactionaries
of the whole world are in confusion and consternation.
All anti-imperialist force of the various Eastern muntries should also unite to oppose the oppression of impe
rialism and the reactionaries within each country, taking
as the objective of their struggle the liberation of the mom
than -a billion oppmsd people of ihe East.
.
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We should hold our destinies completely in our own
hands. W e should clear away all weak and incompetent
thinking within our ranks. AIL viewpoints which overestimate the strength of the enemy and underestimate the
strength of the people are erroneous. Together with the
democratic forces of the whole world, we need only to exert
our efforts, and we can surely defeat the imperialist plans
for enslavement, block a third world war so that it cannot
take place, overthrow the oppression of all reactionaries,
and win the victory of eternal peace for mankind.
We are soberly aware of the fact that there wiI1 still be
all kinds of obstructions and difficulties in our path of
advance. We should prepare to cope with the greatest
degree &£ resistance and struggle on the part of all foreign .
and domestic enemies. Only if we are able to grasp the
science of Marxism-Leninism, have faith in the masses,
stand closely together with the rnases and lead them forward, will we be entirely capable of surmounting any
obstacle and conquering any difficulty, and our strength
will be matchless. This is the historic era in which capital:
ism and imperialism of the whole world are moving taward their doom, in which Socialism and democracy of
the whole world are moving toward victory. The light of
dawn is just before us. We should put forth our efforts.
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